Stable matching with double infinity of workers and firms
In this paper we analyze the existence of stable matchings in a two-sided large market in which workers are assigned to firms. The market has a continuum of workers while the set of firms is countably infinite. We show that, under certain reasonable assumptions on the preference correspondences, s...
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| Autores Principales: | , |
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| Formato: | Online |
| Idioma: | eng |
| Publicado: |
Universidad Nacional del Sur. CONICET
2024
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| Acceso en línea: | https://repositoriodigital.uns.edu.ar/handle/123456789/6875 |
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