Stable matching with double infinity of workers and firms
In this paper we analyze the existence of stable matchings in a two-sided large market in which workers are assigned to firms. The market has a continuum of workers while the set of firms is countably infinite. We show that, under certain reasonable assumptions on the preference correspondences, s...
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Universidad Nacional del Sur. CONICET
2024
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oai:repositorio.bc.uns.edu.ar:123456789-68752024-08-09T18:03:04Z Stable matching with double infinity of workers and firms Tohmé, Fernando Fuentes, Matías Double Infinity Matchings Efficiency Asymptotic Stability Topological Duality Cooperative Games Bargaining Theory General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium Analysis of Collective Decision-Making Matching Theory In this paper we analyze the existence of stable matchings in a two-sided large market in which workers are assigned to firms. The market has a continuum of workers while the set of firms is countably infinite. We show that, under certain reasonable assumptions on the preference correspondences, stable matchings not only exist but are also Pareto optimal. Universidad Nacional San Martín, Escuela de Economía y Negocios 2024-08-08T18:35:34Z 2024-08-08T18:35:34Z 2018 https://repositoriodigital.uns.edu.ar/handle/123456789/6875 eng Atribución – No Comercial (BY-NC): ): Permite a otros distribuir, adaptar, refundir y crear a partir de LA OBRA siempre que no se haga con fines comerciales. Deben darle crédito al autor por la creación original. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ 12 págs. application/pdf Universidad Nacional del Sur. CONICET |
| institution |
UNS |
| collection |
Repositorio Institucional |
| building |
Biblioteca de Economía |
| repo_str |
Repositorio Institucional del Departamento de Economía |
| hierarchy_parent_id |
repo_eco |
| hierarchy_parent_title |
Repositorio Institucional del Departamento de Economía |
| hierarchy_top_id |
repo_str |
| hierarchy_top_title |
Repositorio Institucional |
| first_indexed |
2018-08-22T17:39:27Z |
| last_indexed |
2018-08-22T17:39:27Z |
| language |
eng |
| format |
Online |
| author |
Tohmé, Fernando Fuentes, Matías |
| spellingShingle |
Tohmé, Fernando Fuentes, Matías Stable matching with double infinity of workers and firms |
| author_facet |
Tohmé, Fernando Fuentes, Matías |
| author_sort |
Tohmé, Fernando |
| title |
Stable matching with double infinity of workers and firms |
| title_short |
Stable matching with double infinity of workers and firms |
| title_full |
Stable matching with double infinity of workers and firms |
| title_fullStr |
Stable matching with double infinity of workers and firms |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Stable matching with double infinity of workers and firms |
| title_sort |
stable matching with double infinity of workers and firms |
| topic_facet |
Double Infinity Matchings Efficiency Asymptotic Stability Topological Duality Cooperative Games Bargaining Theory General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium Analysis of Collective Decision-Making Matching Theory |
| description |
In this paper we analyze the existence of stable matchings in a two-sided large market in which workers are
assigned to firms. The market has a continuum of workers while the set of firms is countably infinite. We show
that, under certain reasonable assumptions on the preference correspondences, stable matchings not only exist
but are also Pareto optimal. |
| publisher |
Universidad Nacional del Sur. CONICET |
| publishDate |
2024 |
| url |
https://repositoriodigital.uns.edu.ar/handle/123456789/6875 |
| _version_ |
1815949335112712192 |
| score |
12,614403 |